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ABSTRACT
The streamlined administrative program that BP set up to pay
claims arising out of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill—the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility (GCCF)—promised a significant transactioncost savings over litigation in the public court system. At least in
theory, that savings should have worked to the benefit of BP and
claimants alike, freeing up money to fund claimants’ recoveries that
otherwise would have gone to lawyers and other litigation costs. But
a comparison of the GCCF to the class action settlement that
replaced it reveals that the class settlement will result in greater
payments to claimants. Paradoxically, the dispute resolution system
with the higher built-in transaction costs appears to offer the parties
a superior result. This Article offers some hypotheses for why this
might be the case. The central claim is that claimants did better
under the higher-cost class action settlement because it allowed
them to offer the defendant something it valued—a greater degree of
finality than the GCCF could ever provide—in exchange for a
“peace premium.” And this Article analyzes some of the features of
the public system of class action litigation that enable parties to
obtain a greater degree of closure than a purely private dispute
resolution system like the GCCF, while at the same time providing
guarantees of transparency, consistency, and equitable treatment of
absentees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,1 BP did something
remarkable. It voluntarily (well, with a little prodding from
President Obama2) set up an administrative program, the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility (GCCF),3 that aimed to fully compensate all of the
victims of the spill. The GCCF’s funding was uncapped. BP brought
in the nation’s preeminent independent claims administrator,
Kenneth Feinberg, to run the program, free from BP’s interference.
BP paid all of the expenses. And it backed up all of this by setting
aside $20 billion in a trust fund, with an open-ended commitment
should that amount prove insufficient.4
In theory, the GCCF should have resolved the private claims
against BP in a streamlined and efficient manner. As envisioned
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),5 the GCCF operated as a
private dispute resolution process that would offer swift recompense
in an informal administrative setting, allowing both claimants and
BP to realize savings over traditional litigation. This settlement
structure under OPA, again at least in theory, should have been the
best of all worlds.
To make sure that compensation reaches victims without undue
delay after an oil discharge, OPA makes the primary “responsible
party,” designated by the Coast Guard, strictly liable for all cleanup
costs and resulting economic harms and only later allows that party
to seek contribution from other potential wrongdoers in subsequent
proceedings.6 The statute requires the responsible party to set up and
publicize a procedure for expeditiously settling and paying claims—
including claims for interim, short-term damages—presented by
1. For a dramatic account of the events leading to the explosion and sinking
of the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig, see JOHN KONRAD & TOM SCHRODER,
FIRE ON THE HORIZON (2011).
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the
BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill.
3. See BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, app. ex. L (Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for
Emergency Advance Payments) (June 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice
.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf [hereinafter DOJ AUDIT].
4. Press Release, The White House, FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow
(June 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/factsheet-claims-and-escrow.
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2712−13 (2006).
6. Id. § 2702(a), (d)(1)(B). See also id. §§ 2709, 2715; In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp.
2d 943, 959 (E.D. La. 2011).
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individuals or businesses injured by the spill.7 And the statute
channels claims into this form of private dispute resolution by
prohibiting claimants from suing in court without first exhausting
the responsible party’s administrative claims process.8
Though the statutory text provides next to no guidance on what
the responsible party’s claims process should look like, the intent of
this scheme is clear: to promote settlement and discourage
litigation.9 OPA was born out of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in
Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Congress sought to avoid the
anguishing delays and protracted legal battles that followed that and
other spills. The Exxon Valdez spill showed that beyond the
immediate effects on the environment, a serious oil spill had the
capacity to impede maritime and fishing activity. For many
communities, such a disruption would have ripple effects into the
attendant support economy, resulting in a wide-scale economic
slowdown reaching well beyond those suffering the immediate
contact with the spilled oil. OPA was intended to prevent a
downward economic cascade by bringing a quick infusion of cash to
the afflicted community. Accordingly, it reflects a congressional
preference for informal private dispute resolution over litigation in
the public court system. OPA’s legislative history is replete with
statements that the “system of liability and compensation” it creates
“is intended to allow for quick and complete payment of reasonable
claims without resort to cumbersome litigation.”10
The GCCF was a manifestation of this statutory aim to
streamline the process of recovery, though it went far beyond
anything the statute actually anticipated. OPA simply was not
designed to deal with a disaster of the scale or complexity of the
Deepwater Horizon spill, as evidenced by its almost quaint $75

7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a), 2714 (2006).
8. Id. § 2713. See also In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959, 964.
9. See In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (“The intent is to encourage
settlement and reduce the need for litigation.”); Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co.,
830 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“The purpose of the claim presentation
procedure is to promote settlement and avoid litigation. Congress believed that
lawsuits against parties are appropriate only ‘where attempts to reach a settlement
with the responsible party . . . were unsuccessful.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 242, at
66 (1989))).
10. 135 CONG. REC. H7954-02, at H7965, 1989 WL 187822 (Nov. 2, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt). See also id. at H7962 (statement of Rep.
Lent) (“The thrust of this legislation is to eliminate, to the extent possible, the need
for an injured person to seek recourse through the litigation process, which—as we
all know—can take years.”); S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 25 (1990) (“It is the intent of
the Committee that claims should be expeditiously paid whenever possible, and
that claimants should not be left with the courts as their only recourse . . . .”).
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million limit on liability, which BP waived.11 Ambitiously, the
GCCF set out to expeditiously resolve all of the private oil spill
related claims against BP outside of the court system. The
combination of strict liability and a simplified claims procedure
should have permitted claimants to proceed on their own, without
the need for costly counsel. BP too could avoid the travails and costs
of the court system.12 And, in fact, through its streamlined
procedures, the GCCF paid out an eye-opening $6.2 billion to more
than 220,000 claimants in just 18 months of operation.13 Contrast
this with the decades of costly litigation that followed the Exxon
Valdez spill. What more could anyone possibly want?
The easy answer might be that lawyers, being lawyers, would
find the lack of attorney involvement in the system suspect, both in
theory and because it cost them business. And certainly there were
plenty of lawsuits filed against BP, despite the availability of the
GCCF, mostly on behalf of individuals or groups of clients, some on
behalf of state and local governmental entities, along with a
sprinkling of putative class actions thrown into the mix. Those
lawsuits were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation (MDL) in
front of Judge Carl Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana,
either through the MDL pretrial transfer process or directly as venue
transfers within the federal court system.14 The consolidated action
included hundreds of cases and thousands of individual claimants.15
11. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). Even OPA’s back-up, government-created
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for compensating claimants when the responsible
party is unable was grossly inadequate at only $1 billion. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509
(2006).
12. See, e.g., Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public
Fund: Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30
MISS. C. L. REV. 255, 256 (2011).
13. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/697201241917226179477.pdf.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (allowing the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation to transfer related claims to a single district court for pretrial purposes);
id. § 1404 (allowing one district court to transfer venue to another for convenience
of parties); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (centralizing
claims for pretrial purposes in Eastern District of Louisiana); In re Complaint and
Petition of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, No. 10-cv-1721 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2010)
(Docket Entry 207) (transferring venue of maritime Limitation Act claim from
Southern District of Texas to Eastern District of Louisiana); In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No.
2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010) (Document No. 62) (consolidating transferred
limitation action with MDL proceedings).
15. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex.,
on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012).
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The MDL proceedings were complex and costly, involving a web of
defendants and third parties, overlapping bodies of law, scores of
expert reports, hundreds of depositions, and more than 90 million
pages of discovery documents.16
However, the challenge of the aftermath of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster reveals something more fundamental about the
multifaceted objectives of this kind of mass litigation. These mass
harms take on the quality of public law litigation,17 even if played
out in thousands of claims for private recompense. The problem in
these mass cases is “what do to about the manifestly public
dimension of such private law disputes,”18 even disregarding the
actual public litigation against BP brought by the federal
government and state and local public entities. In such polycentric
disputes,19 the task is not only to resolve the multiple individual
claims but to provide a coordination mechanism that can bring
finality to the dispute.
The history of the GCCF and the continuing litigation well
illustrate this point. The GCCF was most successful in realizing the
OPA objective of finding a quick payment structure designed to
limit the dislocations experienced after the Exxon Valdez spill. To
its great credit, the GCCF achieved one of OPA’s primary statutory
objectives by quickly restoring billions of dollars into the crippled
Gulf economy. And BP’s very public commitment to rapidly
distribute payments through the GCCF may have alleviated some of
the immediate political pressure it faced in the wake of the spill.
But the incompleteness of this model of quick private resolution
soon became apparent to all.
As the claims by numerous private and public parties were
heading to trial, BP decided to shift strategies away from the GCCF
model. Instead of the one-by-one offer and acceptance model of the
GCCF, BP and the private lawyers organized as the Plaintiffs’
Steering Committee in the MDL proceeding reached an agreement
on a plan to settle the economic and property damage claims, as well
as claims for medical injury for individuals who were not on the
Deepwater Horizon drilling platform (e.g., clean-up workers
exposed to oil or chemical dispersants) on a comprehensive basis.
The parties negotiated two class action settlements that, after notice
16. Id. at 901.
17. The term is taken from the seminal article, Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282−83 (1976).
18. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT.
REV. 183, 205 (2008).
19. This term for broad-scale disputes with multiple interested parties draws
from Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394−405 (1978).
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to class members and court approval, replaced the GCCF with a
court-supervised claims resolution facility that, like the GCCF, also
aimed to fully compensate victims of the spill. Unlike the GCCF,
however, the class settlements were premised on the participation of
lawyers, both in their creation and implementation. And those
lawyers would have to be paid.
Although the overall administrative cost of the GCCF is not
publicly available, it is certainly likely that the public litigation
system was more costly in this case in the sense of having higher
built-in transaction costs.20 The class action settlements include a
reserve fund of $600 million that can be awarded as fees by the
court to private counsel, not to mention the costs of notice to the
class and the formalities and discovery procedures of litigation in
federal court.21 And both the class resolution and BP’s voluntary
efforts with the GCCF reached the same end result—an
administrative claims resolution facility to provide compensation to
victims without a trial. Indeed, the class settlement prompted
accusations that “class counsel becomes unimaginably wealthy . . .
and the class gets nothing they wouldn’t have had before.”22
But by all appearances, claimants will be receiving higher
payments under the class settlement than under the GCCF, and in
some cases much higher payments. Paradoxically, the dispute
resolution system with the higher transaction costs—the class
action—appears superior in terms of what was achieved for the
claimant population. For the purposes of this Article, we will
assume that this is the case across the board, and we will offer some
examples to show the significance of the increased payments
available under the class settlements compared with the GCCF.

20. See, e.g., Stier, supra note 12, at 256.
21. Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement
Agreement as Amended on May 2, 2012 § 14.1 ex. 27 para. 2, In re Oil Spill by
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter Class Settlement Agreement],
available at http://www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com/Economic/Settlement
Agreement.aspx (follow “Amended Settlement Agreement” hyperlink). See also
In re Aqua Dots Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the
greater transaction costs of class action litigation in the form of attorneys’ fees and
cost of notice and suggesting that a representative who proposes to incur these
costs when a defendant has already set up a voluntary compensation program is
not adequately protecting the class’s interests under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23).
22. Memorandum in Support of Objections to the Economic and Property
Damages Settlement by Objectors Hunter Armour and Judith Armour at 2, In re
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20,
2010, MDL No. 2179, 10-cv-7777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012) (Document No. 86).
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We then devote our primary attention to what appears
paradoxical. Presumably in an exchange between two parties, the
lower the transaction costs, the greater the joint welfare of the
parties. In turn, economic theory would predict that lowering
transaction costs would mean that both parties could profit from a
mutually beneficial distribution of the surplus.23 Assuming that the
ensuing bargain would result in a shared distribution of this
newfound surplus, then all parties should be better off in a system
with lowered transaction costs. This is not a complicated insight.
Anytime two parties must divide a fixed sum, say $100, they will
optimize their joint welfare if they can share the entire $100. By
extension, any transaction costs incurred by the parties in resolving
the distribution—such as payments to lawyers to negotiate or
litigate—reduces their joint welfare. Basically, every penny paid to
outside parties in determining the distribution comes out of that
$100. The lower the transaction costs, the greater the resources for
the parties to attend to their joint needs. Because claimants will be
paid from the pot of money held by BP, it would seem that they
would share with BP a desire to minimize transaction costs.
The apparent paradox is that the higher cost system in the BP oil
spill controversy seems to have worked exactly to the contrary.
Rather than the transaction costs reducing the claimants’ eventual
recoveries, the class settlement appears to have resulted in greater
recoveries for those affected by the oil spill.
We offer some hypotheses for why this might have been the
case. Our central argument is that the claimants did better under the
class action settlement because it allowed them to offer BP
something it valued—a greater degree of finality than the GCCF
could ever provide—in exchange for a “peace premium.” At this
level, the higher cost system almost appears to offer a win-win for
claimants and BP. Additionally, other features of the public system
of class action litigation, including guarantees of transparency,
consistent treatment of similar claims, and the ability to bind
absentees who do not affirmatively opt out, improved the efficacy of
the settlement structure in terms of achieving closure and aided in
satisfying the equitable concerns of the court in binding absent class
members.
23. For an extreme and unfortunate application of this economic logic in legal
doctrine, see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991).
There, Justice Blackmun reasoned that, ex ante, passengers injured in a cruise ship
accident could only benefit from a forum selection clause favoring the carrier, on
the grounds that the lower costs of legal accountability would surely be passed on
to the consumers of the services in terms of lower prices. Id. The Court did not
explain whether the logic of that position would hold as well to the elimination of
all tort liability.
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II. COMPARING PERFORMANCE: THE CLASS ACTION AND THE GCCF
We start by offering some examples of the ways in which the
class action settlement provided claimants with greater
compensation than they would have received from the GCCF. Our
attention here is on the class settlement for economic claims because
this allows a direct apples-to-apples comparison.24 This is not meant
to be a comprehensive comparison of the two programs. Rather, it is
an illustration of how claimants fared in some major categories of
relief under both approaches. In at least four important ways—
higher damages multipliers, more flexibility in past economic loss
calculations, huge sums devoted to the seafood industry, and
payments for additional types of property damages claims—the
class settlement favorably compares to the GCCF.
A. Risk Transfer Premium Multipliers
Neither the GCCF nor the class action settlement limited
compensation only to past economic losses stemming from the oil
spill. Both programs also paid damages multipliers to account for
the risk of oil coming back, potential future economic losses, and
other unknowns.25 And both sought to compensate claimants for the
prospect of punitive damages awards that BP would face at trial
should cases not settle. The GCCF called these multipliers “Future
Recovery Factors;”26 the class settlement called them “risk transfer

24. The benefits of the medical claims settlement include long-term
monitoring, the opening of health resource facilities in the Gulf Coast region, and
other mechanisms for health provision unlike anything anticipated in the GCCF
process, which necessarily focused on efforts to resolve individual claims. See
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement as Amended on
May 1, 2012 §§ VII(B), IX(A), In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. 2012),
available at www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com/Documents/Medical%20SA
/Medical_Settlement_Agreement.pdf. A comparison of the medical claims class
settlement to the GCCF would be even more one-directional in favor of the terms
of the class action. Such a comparison would be unfair to the GCCF, which did
not endeavor to resolve such long-term needs.
25. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex.,
on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 904 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The RTP
compensates class members for potential future losses, as well as pre-judgment
interest, any risk of oil returning, any claims for consequential damages,
inconvenience, aggravation, the lost value of money, compensation for emotional
distress, liquidation of legal disputes about punitive damages, and other factors.”);
DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38.
26. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38.
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premiums” (RTPs).27 The multipliers varied based on the category
of claims, and of course, total compensation depended on the
underlying loss calculation being multiplied. In practice, these
multipliers made up a significant portion of the compensation that
BP paid claimants in exchange for a final release.
From the very start of the GCCF program, there was uncertainty
about the compensation that might ultimately be recovered from BP.
Initially, the GCCF simply paid double the demonstrated past
economic losses for all categories of claims, except for claims
brought by oyster harvesters and processers to which it applied a
Future Recovery Factor of four.28 Later in its operation, the GCCF
began paying four times past losses for crab and shrimp harvesters
and processors, as well,29 and increased the multiplier for certain
leaseholders of oyster beds to as high as seven.30 These multipliers
were not, however, automatically applied to claims over $500,000;
the total compensation for such large claims needed individual
approval by the claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg.31 We will
return to the question of the variability over time of the recoveries,
and the incentives that this fluctuation created for holdouts. For
now, we address only the amounts at stake, not the strategic
consequences of the lack of fixed payments.
In contrast to the GCCF, the class settlement was transparent
and fixed on its payment schedule, again a point to which we will
return. Of present concern, the class settlement risk transfer
premiums were not only more finely grained, but in almost every
category of claims, the class settlement was more generous—in
some cases, much more generous. And, unlike the GCCF, there was
no limit on the size of claims to which the risk transfer premiums
would be applied. Figure 1 compares the effective multipliers paid
by the GCCF and the class settlement for different categories of
claims.

27. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, ex. 15. Under the class
settlement, RTPs are applied and paid on top of demonstrated past losses. That is,
if a business lost $10,000 because of the spill and had an RTP of two, it would
receive $30,000 because the demonstrated loss would be multiplied by two, and
the resulting $20,000 would be added to the original $10,000. Thus, an RTP of
two (e.g., for tourism claims in Zones B and C) would translate to an effective
multiplier of three.
28. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 38 n.24.
31. Id. at 43 n.34.
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Figure 1: Loss Compensation Multipliers Under GCCF and Class
Settlement32
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Take tourism, for example, because tourism claims made up a
significant portion of compensable claims under both programs. The
class settlement risk transfer premiums substantially increased total
compensation for tourism claims. Under the class settlement, these
claims were paid between 12.5% and 75% more than the GCCF
would have paid depending on the tourism business’s location.33
And in many seafood categories, claimants were overwhelmingly
better off under the class settlement’s risk transfer premium

32. This chart is derived from data in the DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38−39
and Exhibit 15 of the Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21. The multipliers
for the class settlement reflect total compensation of ((1 + RTP) times economic
loss).
33. The class settlement grouped claimants into geographical zones (A, B, C,
and D) based on their proximity to the parts of the Gulf Coast most severely
impacted by the spill. Zone A included the hardest hit areas of coastline. Zone B
included some coastline and proximate areas. Zone C consisted primarily of areas
just inland of Zones A and B, still relatively close to the coast. Zone D included
areas in Gulf Coast states more distant from the shoreline. See Class Settlement
Agreement, supra note 21, exs. 1A, 1B.
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framework, with up to 250% increases over what the GCCF would
have paid.34
These are potentially huge increases in compensation. Even if
the underlying loss calculation proved less generous in the class
settlement than the GCCF (and there is no indication that it did, in
fact quite the contrary35), the increase in the damages multiplier
would still result in substantially more compensation for most
claimants.
B. Choice of Comparison Intervals for Calculating Economic Loss
Any analysis of the damages multiplier under the two claimsresolution systems is necessarily incomplete without an analysis of
the multiplicand. In addition to more generous damages multipliers,
the class action settlement calculated past economic losses
differently from the GCCF. Both programs began their computation
of past economic losses (which would then be used as a base for the
damages multiplier in determining total compensation) by
comparing income after the spill with income in a defined
benchmark period before the spill, but the class settlement gave
claimants more flexibility. The key difference was the length of the
comparison period.
The GCCF compared a business claimant’s revenue for the
remainder of the calendar year following the spill (from April 20,
2010, through December 31, 2010) with the claimant’s revenue in a
benchmark period consisting of those same eight months in the
claimant’s best year out of 2008, 2009, or projected 2010.36 The
result was then adjusted to account for expenses avoided as a result
of diminished business activity, among other factors.37 So, for
example, a fisherman who was unable to fish in contaminated
waters would have an offset for fuel and other expenditures that
would normally accompany the economic activity.
The class settlement, on the other hand, allowed claimants to
select a comparison interval as short as three months (or as long as
eight months). That is, claimants could choose income from any
three consecutive months between May and December of 2010 to
compare with income in a benchmark period of the same three
34. The only category in which the GCCF would appear to pay more than the
class settlement is represented by the last bars on the right. This is for businesses
in areas that are not adjacent to the Gulf and that were not connected to tourism or
seafood.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 42–43. See also id. ex. R para. III.4.a.
37. Id. at 42–43.
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months in 2009, average of 2008–2009, or average of 2007–2009.38
This flexibility to choose a shorter comparison interval let claimants
take advantage of the natural variability in revenue and expenses
over the course of a year.39 Claimants could choose a three-month
period in which their income was particularly bad in 2010 or
particularly good in the benchmark period and exclude from the
calculation other months in which their 2010 income might actually
have been quite good. Indeed, even claimants who had a better year
following the oil spill could still obtain compensation under the
class settlement based on a few bad months.40
An example will help illustrate. Figure 2 shows retail sales data
for Benton County, Mississippi, broken down into three-month
rolling averages for the comparison and benchmark years. This
particular illustration was presented at the fairness hearing on the
class settlement by Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.—which was
not a party to the settlement—in order to bolster its objection that
the settlement was too generous and that Halliburton should not be
held liable for contribution to the actual payments to the class.
Under the Halliburton study, industry-wide data is used as a stand-in
38. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, ex. 4C.
39. BP has argued that this was not the intent of the class settlement in all
cases, particularly for businesses with high variability in revenue and expense
realization. The settlement claims administrator, Patrick Juneau, and the district
court rejected BP’s argument. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”
in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2013)
(Document No. 8812), available at http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomic
settlement.com/docs.php (follow “Review of Issue From Panel (Matching of
Revenue and Expenses) (March 5, 2013)” hyperlink) (“Notably the Benchmark
and Comparison Periods must be a minimum of three months. This demonstrates
that the parties anticipated that too short a snapshot could create ‘anomalies,’ and
the three-month minimum was the agreed-upon method for controlling for such
anomalies.”). In two separate orders so far, the Fifth Circuit has remanded the
issue to Judge Barbier to determine how profits are calculated in light of when
expenses are realized, In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2013), and
subsequently to determine “those who experienced actual injury traceable to loss
from the Deepwater Horizon accident,” In re Deepwater Horizon, Nos. 13-30315,
13-30329 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2013) (Document No. 122). The center of gravity of
the dispute has been over the proper interpretation of the terms “revenue” and
“expenses”—essentially whether the terms should be understood on a cash or
accrual basis. However this issue is ultimately resolved will not change the fact
that the class settlement’s shorter comparison interval gives claimants more
flexibility to take advantage of fluctuations in revenue and expenses than the
GCCF’s longer comparison interval.
40. Declaration of Marc Vellrath Regarding the Proposed Economic &
Property Damages Settlement Agreement para. 140, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 10cv-7777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012) (Document No. 91-2) [hereinafter Vellrath
Declaration].
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for an actual retail claimant who would fit the “tourism” business
definition under the class settlement, but it is not difficult to imagine
claimants that had the same revenue patterns as the industry as a
whole.41 Retail sales in Benton County for 2010, the year following
the spill, were actually about 32% higher than sales in 2009, but
November and December of 2010 were particularly bad months,
with sharp decreases from November and December in previous
years.42 By choosing October/November/December as a comparison
interval, a claimant with Benton County’s revenue pattern could
recover under the class settlement, even though it would not have
been able to recover with the GCCF’s eight-month interval.
Figure 2: Average Retail Sales for Three-Month Benchmark
Periods for Benton County, Mississippi (in thousands)43
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The flexibility to choose a shorter comparison interval under the
class settlement allowed claimants to exploit short-term variability
in their income streams. This is essentially the inverse of the law of
large numbers. Fluctuations in revenue and expenses are more likely
to even out over an eight-month period than over a three-month
period. By allowing claimants to choose a three-month comparison
period to calculate economic loss, the class settlement allowed them
41. See id. paras. 138−39.
42. Id. para. 141.
43. This chart is derived from data in the Vellrath Declaration, supra note 40,
para. 141 based on retail sales data for Benton County obtained from the
Mississippi Department of Revenue.

410

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

to take the maximum advantage of that variability, while the
GCCF’s formula compares revenue and expense information that
has been smoothed out over an eight-month period.
C. Seafood Compensation Program
Both the GCCF and the class settlement provided greater
compensation to seafood claimants than to most other types of
claimants. The reason is not difficult to discern, as the oiled waters
of the Gulf were the most notorious manifestation of the
environmental damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon explosion.
Indeed, the image of the oil slick spreading as BP tried desperately
to cap the gushing well riveted the nation and brought the Gulf’s
seafood industry to a grinding halt. But the seafood compensation
program under the class settlement was extraordinarily generous,
with guaranteed payments that exceeded the annual revenue of the
entire Gulf seafood industry many times over.
Greater compensation for the seafood industry was inevitable
under any settlement program. The public attention to the
compromised fisheries meant that causation and proof of harm for
seafood claims would be most easily established in any trial and
would be the most likely source of punitive damages against the
responsible parties. Although the GCCF treated seafood claims
similarly to other economic loss claims, it provided additional
compensation by offering the compromised fishing industry higher
damages multipliers. The GCCF paid four times the demonstrable
losses for most seafood claims and up to seven times the
demonstrable losses for oyster bed leaseholders. And its funding
was uncapped.
The class settlement, on the other hand, had a separate seafood
compensation program that, as discussed above, applied greater
damages multipliers than the GCCF (ranging from 3.25 to 9.75).44
And compensation under the seafood program was set at a fixed
amount of $2.3 billion. This fixed fund is a departure from the
structure of the GCCF and of the rest of the class settlement
program; it sets not only a guaranteed payment but a cap on
damages as well. But do not be fooled by the cap. As Figure 3
shows, the capped $2.3 billion fund is approximately five times the
total annual revenue (not lost profits) of the entire Gulf seafood
industry.45
44. See supra Part II.A.
45. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 909 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The
guaranteed total of $2.3 billion allocated to the SCP represents approximately five
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Figure 3: Class Settlement Seafood Compensation Program
Payments Versus Total Annual Gulf Seafood Revenues (in
millions)46

This fund greatly exceeded the expected payments under the
class settlement’s (already generous) compensation formula, which
were projected to be approximately $1.9 billion.47 And the $400
million left over would not revert back to BP. Instead, it would be
paid out to class members pro rata in a second round distribution.
So, the entire $2.3 billion fund is guaranteed to be paid out to
times the annual average industry gross revenue for 2007 to 2009 of the Seafood
industry in the region covered by the Settlement Agreement. $2.3 billion also
represents 19.2 times lost industry revenue in 2010, according to the evidence
provided.”).
46. This chart is derived from Gulf seafood revenue data from NOAA ALS in
the Class Presentation PowerPoint presented in court at the hearing on preliminary
approval of the class settlement, Hearing on Preliminary Approval at the United
States District Court for Eastern District of Louisiana 28−30, available at
http://www.cossichlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/class-presentation.pdf,
and Exhibit 10 of the Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21. Seafood
revenue data excludes landings of menhaden, which were excluded from the
settlement program.
47. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d, at 908–09. See also Vellrath Declaration,
supra note 40, paras. 231−32.
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claimants—above and beyond their demonstrable losses and
damages multipliers.48 Even capped, the class settlement’s seafood
compensation program put far more money on the table for seafood
claimants than the GCCF.
D. Additional Types of Claims Paid
Finally, the class settlement paid some categories of claims that
the GCCF did not. For example, the class settlement provided
compensation for (1) the loss of use and enjoyment of coastal real
property, (2) physical damage to property caused by cleanup
operations, and (3) losses on the sale of residential property.49 The
GCCF did not pay any of these types of claims.
Overall, the class settlement appeared so generous that it created
the unusual situation in which many of the objectors to its approval
were non-class members trying to get into the class.50 In addition,
Halliburton, one of BP’s codefendants that was not a party to the
settlement agreement, interposed a lengthy objection (complete with
an economist’s 200+ page expert report) arguing that the settlement
was paying class members too much money.51
III. HOW COULD THE PROCESS WITH THE HIGHER TRANSACTION
COSTS BE SUPERIOR FOR CLAIMANTS AND THE DEFENDANT?
We start from the supposition that both sides did better—The
claimants got more money, and the defendant got more closure—
under the public litigation system with higher transaction costs than
48. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 908–09; Vellrath Declaration, supra
note 40, para. 232. It is also worth noting that the $2.3 billion fund is not reduced
by amounts that seafood claimants may have already received from BP through
the GCCF as Emergency or Interim Payments because the entire remainder will be
distributed in the second round. Vellrath Declaration, supra note 40, para. 233.
Even claimants who took GCCF payments will receive the pro rata second round
distribution based on the full value of their claims. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d
at 908–09.
49. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, §§ 5.7−5.9, exs. 11A−13B.
50. See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (“This Settlement . . . is
remarkable in that it seems to have resulted in large numbers of non-class
members objecting to being excluded from the Settlement.”); id. at 934 (“[The
settlement’s adequacy] is perhaps best illustrated by the extraordinary number of
putative objectors (non-class members) who wish to be included within the
Settlement . . . . ‘What the objections do illustrate—in vivid form—is the fact that
this settlement is viewed as so desirable that people are clamoring to get in.’”).
51. See Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.’s Objections to Final Approval of
Economic and Property Damages Class Settlement, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179
(Document No. 91) (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012); Vellrath Declaration, supra note 40.
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in the streamlined private dispute resolution system that BP set up
under OPA. As the prior section shows, we believe that the facts
fully bear this out. We have been unable to find any significant
category of recovery in which claimants did better under the GCCF
than under the scheduled payments of the class settlement. But our
central hypothesis is not the empirical comparison; that proof is a
matter of record in the ongoing litigation and appeals involving BP
and other parties to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Rather, we
offer an explanation as to why this may be the case, an inquiry that
has a distinct import well beyond the BP case. It is not a question, as
is sometimes joked about by economists, that something working
well in practice cannot be true unless there is an accompanying
theory. Precisely because higher recovery with higher transaction
costs is counterintuitive, there should be some account for why this
might be. At bottom, a claimant’s ability to obtain greater
compensation under the class action settlement, despite its greater
transaction costs, must reflect some factor in play that gave BP
something it valued—and for which it was willing to pay—but
could not get through the GCCF. We think that factor is peace.
Below we sketch out some of the reasons why the class action
settlement might have given all parties, including BP, a superior
result than the GCCF and why BP might have been able and willing
to pay more for a dispute resolution system with those features.
A. Defendants Will Pay a Premium for Peace
Defendants in mass litigation want peace, and they are often
willing to pay for it. In a recent antitrust case involving multiple
class action suits raising a variety of claims on behalf of thousands
of claimants, the Third Circuit addressed the possibility that the
claims had greater settlement value when they were joined together
than they had separately: “From a practical standpoint . . . achieving
global peace is a valid, and valuable, incentive to class action
settlements . . . . [A defendant] may be motivated to pay class
members a premium and achieve a global settlement in order to
avoid additional lawsuits . . . .”52 If true, part of the explanation for
the higher sums available through the BP class settlement than
52. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 311, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica,
J., concurring). The World Trade Center Disaster Site settlement provides an
excellent example of the peace premium. There, the defendant was willing to
make sizable “bonus payments” to get the last 5% of plaintiffs to sign on to a
global settlement. See In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp.
2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process
Agreement, As Amended §§ II.A, IV, VI.E, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts
.gov/cases/show.php?db=911&id=540.
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through the GCCF might have to do with BP’s willingness to
sweeten the pot in exchange for greater closure. But if defendants
are indeed willing to pay extra for a global settlement that resolves
all claims in a single transaction instead of piecemeal serial litigation
or settlements, we need to understand what underlies this “peace
premium.”53
First, and most obvious, are the lesser costs associated with
fewer litigation or settlement transactions. Settling all of the claims
in a single transaction allows the defendant to take advantage of
economies of scale. Handling claims in bulk is simply more cost
effective. The marginal cost of adding another claim to a group
settlement is typically less than the cost of individually negotiating a
separate settlement.54 And if an incomplete settlement leaves the
defendant litigating against a handful of non-settling plaintiffs, there
are fewer cases across which to spread the costs of developing
common factual and legal issues that will arise at trial.
Second, by settling all the claims at once, a defendant can avoid
the risk of adverse selection. Plaintiffs (and the lawyers who
represent groups of plaintiffs) tend to know more about the relative
strength and value of their individual claims than the defendant, and
if they are allowed to elect whether or not to participate in a group
settlement, there is a danger that the plaintiffs with the strongest
claims will opt out.55 A defendant understandably does not want to
pay top dollar to settle a collection of weak claims only to be left
facing the strongest claims in continued litigation. Because it must
hold back money to litigate against the opt-outs a defendant will
inevitably pay less per claimant to settle an incomplete aggregation
of claims than it would pay in a truly comprehensive settlement.56
And third, continued litigation against a handful of plaintiffs
outside of a group settlement may impose disproportionate costs on
a defendant. A global settlement that gives the defendant closure
allows the defendant to eliminate contingent liabilities, put the
dispute behind it, and focus on its business going forward. By
contrast “continued litigation against even a handful of plaintiffs
may result in additional negative publicity, attract unwanted
regulatory scrutiny, and hamper access to capital markets.”57 And
53. For a more detailed discussion of why defendants might be willing to pay
a peace premium see D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in
Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192−98 (2013).
54. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the
Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 761−62, 766 (1997).
55. Rave, supra note 53, at 1195.
56. Id. at 1194.
57. Id. at 1195. See also Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 339 n.9 (Scirica, J., concurring).
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these costs may be greatly disproportionate to the number or value
of remaining claims.
Indeed, these types of concerns were particularly salient for BP.
The oil spill was a public relations disaster for BP, and the
company’s stock price plummeted in the aftermath of the Deepwater
Horizon explosion, as investors sought more stable and predictable
havens for their capital.58 Perhaps even more importantly, BP’s oil
drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico and elsewhere require
federal regulatory approval.59 BP’s efforts to get emergency
payments out through the GCCF may have helped to alleviate some
political pressure in the short term, but additional negative publicity
from continued litigation put those interests at risk. And even if only
a handful of cases with a relatively small total damages exposure
went to trial, a finding that BP was grossly negligent in any of those
cases would adversely impact its position in still pending
government enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act in
which civil penalties and fines could exceed $20 billion.60
Taken together, these three factors suggest that settlement of
mass claims may be what economists would term a discontinuous,
rather than continuous, function (Figures 4 and 5). The aggregation
of claims is not simply additive. Just as class certification increases
the litigation leverage of small value claims in a non-additive sense
(e.g., two unviable $10 claims do not have more litigation threat
than one $10 claim; a certain threshold of aggregation must be
reached before any of the claims yield additional leverage), so too
there may be compounding effects in the settlement of claims. The
peace premium is a reflection that there may be thresholds that are
critical to defendants. Such thresholds may include complete peace,
the settlement of the claims held by major aggregators on the
plaintiffs’ side,61 the specifics of regulatory compliance, or other
potential case-specific factors. The premium comes from the
realization of whichever threshold is of enhanced value to the
defendant such that each individual plaintiff does not add very much
58. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT 129−30 (2012).
59. Id. See also David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of
Mexico, Environmental Crime, and Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416
(2011).
60. See, e.g., Barry Meier & Clifford Krauss, As BP Trial Nears, Hints of
Progress on a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2013, at B1.
61. This is the best way to understand the Vioxx settlement, which paid a
substantial price not for total peace but for peace with the law firms with credible
litigation threats. See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc., and the
Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto § 1.2.8 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents (follow “Master Settlement
Agreement” hyperlink); see also Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 215−19 (discussing
the Vioxx settlement).
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to the value of the potential settlement until a sufficient number of
claims have been aggregated.

Settlement Value

Figure 4: Continuous Function (No Peace Premium)
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Settlement Value

Figure 5: Discontinuous Function (Peace Premium)
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Because of the peace premium, when many plaintiffs have
similar claims against a common defendant, those claims are often
worth more if they can be bundled up and sold to the defendant (i.e.,
settled) as a single package. The problem is that the rights to control
those claims are dispersed among the individual plaintiffs, and it can
be costly to assemble those rights into a more valuable collective. In
other words, plaintiffs in mass litigation face an “anticommons”
problem that can prevent them from maximizing the value of their
claims.62
62. Rave, supra note 53, at 1190−1201.
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An anticommons occurs when property rights are dispersed
among too many owners, and transaction costs and strategic
holdouts make assembling those rights into a more valuable whole
difficult.63 Individual plaintiffs in mass litigation, who tend to have
no preexisting relationship with each other, face steep transaction
costs to assembling their claims. Worse, because continued litigation
against a handful of plaintiffs (whatever the number below
important thresholds might be) imposes disproportionate costs and
risk on the defendant, strategic holdouts can threaten to deny the
defendant peace in the hopes of extracting a side payment. Even the
mere anticipation of such strategic behavior may cause the
defendant to withhold the peace premium in a mass settlement.64
In many ways, a class action settlement can be understood as a
solution to the anticommons problem in mass litigation.65 The class
action mechanism offers plaintiffs (or, more realistically, a lawyer
acting on their behalf) a relatively low cost method of overcoming
this dynamic and assembling their dispersed rights of action into a
single package for sale to the defendant.66 A Rule 23(b)(3) class
action, of course, allows individual plaintiffs to opt out of a class
settlement,67 so simply using the class action machinery does not
guarantee complete closure. But there are reasons to believe that a
class action settlement allows plaintiffs to credibly offer the
defendant a much greater degree of finality than it could obtain
through one-by-one private settlements. One unanticipated defect of
OPA’s attempt to incentivize private settlements was the inability to
organize systematic closure, as through a class action. This proved a
significant obstacle to a program like the GCCF, where plaintiffs
must affirmatively opt in on an individual basis. As a result, if a
class action settlement promises something approaching peace, the

63. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
64. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 3.17 cmt. b (“Even the threat of such a holdout may cause the defendant to
withhold the premium associated with complete peace, thereby inuring to the
detriment of all the represented claimants.”).
65. Rave, supra note 53, at 1239−45.
66. Id. See also Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions
Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2144−46 (2000).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B), (e)(4). See also Philips Petroleum v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that “due process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class
by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the
court”).
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defendant may be willing to pay a premium over serial individual
litigation or settlement.68
B. The Class Settlement Offered BP More Finality
Several features of the economic and property damages class
action settlement made it possible for plaintiffs to offer BP a greater
degree of finality than it could ever have hoped to achieve through
the GCCF. These features—a walk-away provision, a firm cut-off
date, transparent and consistent procedures, and a shift from an optin model to an opt-out model—may have contributed to BP’s ability
and willingness to pay claimants more under the class action
settlement than through the GCCF.
1. Walk-away Provision
The class action settlement contained a walk-away provision
that allowed BP to back out of the deal if too few plaintiffs
participated. Walk-away provisions are typical in large-scale
aggregate settlements, and they afford defendants some degree of
protection from adverse selection and the loss of economies of scale.
By including a walk-away provision in a settlement agreement, class
counsel is guaranteeing the defendant at least a certain level of peace
as a condition of settlement. If too many plaintiffs opt out, the
defendant is not left in a situation where it has overpaid to settle a
collection of weak claims only to face a substantial number of strong
claims in continued litigation. Instead, the class settlement is
nullified, and all parties continue to litigate.
In effect, walk-away provisions allow a settling defendant a
second option once the entirety of the settlement structure becomes
apparent. Each offer is made with the knowledge that if settlement is
not reached with a sufficient number (or quality) of plaintiffs, then
the initial offers may be rescinded. This frees a settling defendant
from having to withhold money from early settlement offers for fear
of not getting enough claims—or the right claims—resolved.
Particularly if the litigation has been concentrated in the hands of
major plaintiffs’ firms, a partial settlement can be the worst of all
worlds: The weaker claims may settle, and the proceeds from those

68. See Rave, supra note 53, at 1193−95 for an explanation of why a
defendant might be willing to pay a premium even when a settlement does not
include every single claim.
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settlements may provide a war chest for the prosecution of the
stronger claims.69
Paradoxically, however, the same mechanism that gives the
defendant a second option may also compromise the parties’ ability
to achieve a comprehensive settlement. Walk-away provisions
usually condition the settlement on a very high percentage of
plaintiffs participating. A high participation threshold guarantees the
defendant a sufficient degree of peace, but it also empowers
strategic holdouts to threaten to derail the entire deal if they are not
paid off. If a settlement is structured as an all-or-nothing deal, then
any individual plaintiff is a potential holdout.70 But even where the
participation threshold is set lower—say, 95%—it is possible for a
lawyer to coordinate a group of plaintiffs into a holdout bloc that
can extort side payments or a disproportionate share of the
settlement allocation by threatening to opt out en masse.71 The
potential for holdouts can threaten a settlement containing a walkaway provision and, therefore, the plaintiffs’ ability to offer the
defendant peace in exchange for a premium.
The BP class action settlement contained an innovative
provision to deal with this problem. The settlement allowed BP to
walk away if too many plaintiffs opted out, but the walk-away
threshold that the defendant and the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee
agreed upon was not made public. Instead, it was filed with the court
in a sealed envelope.72 Keeping the precise threshold confidential
made it harder for any strategic player attempting to coordinate a
holdout bloc to know whether he had assembled enough plaintiffs
willing to opt out in order to make a credible threat to hold up the
deal. Once the participation threshold was reached and the
settlement became binding, BP could be sure that it had bought at
least a certain degree of peace. It did not risk facing hordes of optouts in continued litigation.
Nothing in the OPA claims resolution process could provide this
second-look protection to BP. A private claims facility like the
GCCF, structured to meet the statutory requirements for a procedure
for claimants to present their claims to the responsible party before
obtaining the right to sue, was necessarily an open-ended offer that
69. This dynamic was the downfall of the Owens Corning Fibreboard
National Settlement Program. See, e.g., RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A
WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 111–12 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass
Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1925, 1936−38 (2002).
70. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements,
58 KAN. L. REV. 979, 981−82 (2010).
71. See Rave, supra note 53, at 1201.
72. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, § 21.3.6.
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facilitated adverse selection. Under the GCCF, BP had no advanced
guarantee that it would achieve any degree of finality. The GCCF
paid claims seriatim, without any assurance that later plaintiffs
would be bound to the same procedures. BP did not know how
many claimants would elect to participate or what percentage of
total claims would be resolved through the GCCF’s administrative
process at the time it began paying claims. Because the claimants
were not bound in advance to pursue their claims through the
GCCF, there was a clear danger that those with weak claims would
take the settlement offers made by the GCCF and those with strong
claims would opt for litigation instead. The rational incentive for BP
was to hold back payments to early settlers as a means to protect
against later-filed, stronger claims. In turn, the vulnerability of being
gamed in this fashion created a corresponding incentive to keep the
details of settlement criteria and settlement amounts as secret as
possible.
Indeed, even the GCCF’s payment structure facilitated adverse
selection. The GCCF generally offered claimants “Final Payments”
for all of their documented past and future losses in exchange for a
release and covenant not to sue.73 The documentation requirements
for Final Payments were fairly stringent. But the GCCF also allowed
claimants to elect a one-time, fixed-sum “Quick Payment” of $5,000
for individuals or $25,000 for businesses based on a much more
limited documentary showing.74 Reducing the evidentiary
requirements for small claims is not irrational; both claimants and
BP may be quite willing to tolerate some loss of accuracy in the
valuation of small claims in order to prevent the transaction costs of
assembling and reviewing documentation from eating up the entire
amount. But the availability of Quick Payments did make the GCCF
relatively more attractive for low-value claims than for high-value
ones. And it comes as no surprise that far more claimants accepted
the fixed-sum offers of Quick Payments than Final Payments, with
the strongest claims refusing to settle through the GCCF and instead
retaining the right to sue.
Because the GCCF did not offer BP an opportunity to back out
of the compensation scheme if too many claimants elected not to
participate—BP could not even know how many opt-outs there
would be until it had already paid those who opted in—and because
adverse selection is predictable, BP had to hold back money to
litigate or individually settle the strongest claims that were most
likely to opt out. In other words, BP had to withhold the peace
premium. The walk-away provision of the class action settlement,
73. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 35.
74. Id. at 34.
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on the other hand, reassured BP that if it was going to face a
significant number of opt-outs in continued litigation, at least it
would not have overpaid to settle a collection of weak claims. That
guarantee allowed BP to commit more resources to the settlement
that would only take effect if it reached a sufficient degree of
finality.
2. Firm Cut-off Date
The class action settlement also imposed a firm cut-off date by
which claimants had to decide whether to participate in the
settlement program or opt out and pursue their claims against BP in
court. If claimants did not file a request to be excluded with the
court by the opt-out deadline, they were bound by the settlement.
The GCCF, on the other hand, was open-ended and allowed
plaintiffs to take a wait-and-see approach, depriving it of the ability
to offer BP finality. Moreover, a rational claimant could assume that
payments would go up over time because the GCCF had to pursue
holdouts against a backdrop of prior settlement amounts.
The GCCF further rewarded delay by allowing claimants to
obtain compensation over an extended period of time without
deciding whether to sue BP in court. Again, this was not necessarily
a design flaw of the GCCF, but rather a function of OPA’s statutory
requirement that the responsible party set up a process to pay claims
for interim, short-term damages, without precluding later recovery
for full damages.75 Claimants could obtain “Interim Payments” from
the GCCF for documented past losses as often as once per quarter
without signing a release.76 While these payments did not include a
damages multiplier to compensate for potential future losses, they
allowed claimants to keep going back to the well for additional
Interim Payments over the life of the GCCF, without giving up the
right to later sue BP.
Interim Payments, thus, made the cost of holding out very low.
Claimants could obtain much of the benefit of participating in the
GCCF—compensation on an ongoing basis for past losses—without
giving up the right to sue. A potential holdout would not have to
forego these benefits to make a credible threat of litigation. As a
result, BP could not make generous offers of Final Payment across
the board because it had to hold back funds to litigate against and

75. 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2006).
76. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 35. See also FEINBERG, supra note 58, at 173
(noting that “claimant[s] could select an interim payment and take a ‘wait and see’
approach to the future”).
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pay strategic claimants who took Interim Payments but would reject
offers of Final Payment and instead threaten to litigate in court.
By contrast, forcing claimants to choose whether to litigate or
participate in the class action settlement by a firm deadline increased
the cost of holding out. Strategic players would have to forego all of
the benefits of the settlement and commit to go it alone in litigation
in order to hold out. They could not take a wait-and-see approach.
The predictable result is fewer holdouts and more certainty and
finality for BP, especially when combined with the walk-away
provision. The opt-out deadline provided a specific date by which
BP would know whether it would obtain a satisfactory degree of
closure through the settlement or should back out of the deal
because of adverse selection. This certainty allowed BP to commit
more resources to the class action settlement ex ante.
3. Transparent and Consistent Procedures
The class action settlement adopted transparent and consistent
procedures to deal with all claims. The payment calculation
methodologies were set out in full detail at the beginning of the
settlement program and could not be modified for the program’s
duration.77 This transparency marked a departure from the GCCF,
which was designed to be flexible. As a result, it could not be
transparent and frequently adjusted its procedures in response to
changing circumstances.78 The increase in transparency and
consistency that accompanied the shift from the GCCF to the class
action settlement made it harder for claimants to extract greater
payments through strategic action.
The GCCF’s lack of transparency was a familiar refrain among
its critics.79 The claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg, retained
77. See Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, § 4.4.7 (“The Settlement
Program and its Claims procedures shall be subject to the ongoing supervision of
the Court. The criteria, documentation, proof, and [compensation amount]
provisions of each of the Claims categories shall apply equally to all Claimants
regardless whether they are proceeding individually, represented by others, or
proceeding as an assignee of an individual Claim. The claims administrator shall
explore and consider the utilization of streamlined procedures to improve the
efficiency of the Claims process, without changing Claims criteria.” (emphasis
added)).
78. See DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 8−9 (“[T]he GCCF’s approach to the
development and implementation of its protocols and methodologies was, by
necessity, a dynamic one. The GCCF constantly made adjustments and
improvements as it gained a greater understanding of the myriad challenges that
emerged during its operations.”).
79. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast
Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71
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the discretion to make changes to the GCCF’s procedures and
claims criteria on the fly.80 Those procedures and claims criteria
evolved throughout the GCCF’s lifespan.81 And the GCCF’s claims
adjusters were able to exercise discretion in evaluating and
calculating losses suffered by business claimants.82 This discretion
and evolution in response to changing circumstances made the
GCCF flexible, but it also facilitated strategic behavior by claimants
and made it more difficult for BP to achieve closure.
As a result of evolving standards under the GCCF, the efforts at
settlement created a dynamic of serial individual negotiations
between a single repeat-player defendant and many single-shot
claimants faced with a collective action problem. The claimants
would maximize the collective value of their claims if they could
coordinate to offer the defendant peace. But if the criteria for
determining the compensation amount are up for grabs with each
claimant, then each claimant is a potential holdout. No individual
claimant internalizes all of the costs of adopting an unreasonable
negotiating strategy. The GCCF’s lack of transparency made it
easier for strategic players to attempt to extract secret payoffs, and
its procedural flexibility let holdouts bargain for prospective
changes to the compensation criteria. This was not necessarily a
failure of the GCCF; the lack of a closure strategy reflected an
attempt to implement OPA’s statutory preference for informal one-

LA. L. REV. 819, 842 n.107, 881−86 (2011); George W. Conk, Diving into the
Wreck: BP and Kenneth Feinberg’s Gulf Coast Gambit, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 137, 141 (2012); Amicus Brief of the States of Alabama, et al. in Support
of Appellees and Affirmance of the District Court at 6−13, In re Deepwater
Horizon, No. 13-30315 (consolidated with No. 13-30315) 2013 WL 2474803 (5th
Cir. May 31, 2013) (summarizing complaints made to the attorneys general of
Alabama and Mississippi and the governor of Alabama about GCCF’s lack of
transparency and consistency).
80. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 58, at 163, 173 (“I did promise that the
GCCF would continue to monitor the Gulf and reserved the right to modify the
recovery factor, up or down, as events unfolded.”); Mullenix, supra note 79, at
841−44.
81. See, e.g., DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 72−76 (noting that similarly
situated claimants were sometimes treated differently because of the evolution of
GCCF’s methodologies).
82. See id. at 43, 54 (noting discretion in calculating losses). In fact, for
business claimants with more than $500,000 in documented losses, the GCCF did
not automatically apply the same damages multiplier for future losses but instead
determined the final payment amount “on an individualized basis after analyzing
input from the claimant as well as the expert.” Id. at 43 n.34. Thus, claimants with
the largest claims and, therefore, the most credible threat to pursue individual
litigation got the opportunity to negotiate their payments individually, outside of
the normal protocol that applied to other claimants.
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by-one claims resolution. But it made it impossible for claimants to
offer BP finality with any credibility.
In the class action settlement, by contrast, all parties made a
credible precommitment to consistently apply the same criteria to all
of the claims made by all claimants over the entire duration of the
settlement program, and those criteria were set out in advance for all
parties to see.83 This commitment to consistency and transparency
raised the cost of holding out. Strategic players and “squeaky
wheels” could not hope that their threats or protestations would
cause the claims administrator secretly to offer increased payments
to get them to go away. Nor could they lobby for prospective
changes in the compensation criteria. The claims administrator’s
hands were tied, and a strategic player’s only choices would be to
take the amount dictated by the class action settlement’s terms or opt
out and go it alone in litigation. Raising the cost of holding out
reassured BP that the money it put into the settlement would buy it
peace and that it would not have to hold back money to deal with an
upward spiral where strategic players sought an ever increasing
series of secret payments.
The adoption of transparent and consistent procedures may have
been motivated by the need to comply with the dictates of Rule 23
and due process.84 But those formal requirements of the public
system of class action litigation have a certain mast-tying effect.
Unlike a purely private arrangement, the parties are not free to
simply renegotiate the terms of the claims resolution scheme as the
process unfolds. Any modifications would need to secure the
approval of a court tasked with protecting the interests of absentees
and ensuring that the settlement is fair and reasonable.85 Perhaps
counterintuitively, this reduction in flexibility had the effect of
making strategic action more difficult and therefore, making it easier
for the plaintiffs to credibly offer BP peace in exchange for a
premium.

83. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 904 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The
Settlement Program calculates awards using public, transparent frameworks that
apply standardized formulas derived from generally accepted and common
methodologies. This level of transparency permits class members to understand
how their claims will be evaluated under the Settlement. It also ensures that
similarly situated class members are treated similarly.”).
84. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Indeed, the disputes in the Fifth Circuit over
the proper damages calculation for business economic losses and causation
illustrate this precommitment to consistent procedures. See supra note 39 (setting
out Fifth Circuit rulings on this issue to date).
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4. Shift from Opt-in to Opt-out
Finally, the class action settlement shifted from the opt-in model
of the GCCF to an opt-out model. Under the GCCF, a claimant
affirmatively had to file a claim, accept the offer of Quick or Final
Payment, and execute a release in order to be bound. Claimants who
did not take these affirmative steps were free to bring suits in court,
at least until the statute of limitations ran. Under the class action
settlement, by contrast, the default rule was flipped. Claimants who
did nothing are bound by the settlement, instead of not bound.
The shift from an opt-in rule to an opt-out rule takes advantage
of claimants’ inertia to achieve greater finality. Why do today what
can be put off until tomorrow? People tend to value the present more
than the future, and it always seems rational to do more pleasant
things today and put off less pleasant chores—Watching football
now is always better than mowing the lawn. People procrastinate
unless there are intervening incentive structures that affect
behavior.86 One such behavioral trait is the propensity to conform
behavior to default rules under conditions of uncertainty. Default
rules tend to be “sticky,” and quite often, people do not make the
effort—even a minimal effort like filing a request to opt out of a
class action settlement with the court—to deviate from them.87
Consequently, setting the default rule as participation with a right to
opt out can be expected to achieve a greater degree of participation
and, thus, finality than setting the rule as non-participation with a
right to opt in.
Note that an opt-out rule combined with a requirement that
claimants actually file a claim in the class action settlement program
to receive compensation could, in theory, benefit the defendant by
reducing the total number of claims the defendant ends up paying

86. See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211
(2003); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116
Q.J. ECON. 121 (2001) (discussing how procrastination may be more severe when
pursuing important, rather than unimportant, goals). See generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
87. See Camerer et al., supra note 86. The procedures for opting out of the
class action settlement were straightforward, well disclosed, and far from onerous.
Claimants who wished to be excluded from the class simply had to submit to the
court a written and signed request to be excluded from the class by November 1,
2012—six months after the court’s preliminary approval of the class settlement.
See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
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compared with a pure opt-in rule.88 But the reduction in the number
of claims paid is not likely to be very large because those claimants
who fail to file either a request to opt out or a claim in the class
action settlement are unlikely to be the claimants who would have
either opted in to a system like the GCCF or taken the much more
onerous affirmative step of suing the defendant individually.
The shift from an opt-in model to an opt-out model does,
however, force claimants with high value claims and strategic
players to identify themselves to the defendant earlier in the process.
Instead of biding their time on the sidelines—or taking the wait-andsee approach of filing for Interim Payments in the GCCF—under
the class action settlement, claimants who intend to pursue
individual litigation have to make their intentions known by the optout date.
The ability to bind absentees is the hallmark of the public class
action litigation system. Thus, it is difficult or impossible to
replicate an opt-out model in a private dispute resolution system as
envisioned under OPA. Only a court’s imprimatur—and a deal that
comports with the formalities and safeguards of the class action
system—can bind absentees without their affirmative consent. But
this is one of the advantages of public litigation over private
ordering in this case. By binding claimants who do nothing and
forcing those who wish to litigate to identify themselves, the opt-out
feature of the class action settlement removes the potential for
surprise and gives BP a greater degree of closure and certainty as to
its continuing exposure. Closure and certainty are valuable
commodities to a defendant like BP—which faced regulatory, public
relations, and capital markets pressures—and plaintiffs could
demand a premium for delivering them.
C. The Shift from Private Alternative Dispute Resolution to Public
Class Action Litigation Looked Like a Win-Win
Taken together, these features of the class action settlement
could give BP what it wanted—a greater degree of finality than it
could get from the sort of private dispute resolution system
envisioned by OPA. And the results appear to bear this out, as only
a tiny fraction (about 1.2%) of plaintiffs opted out of the class action
settlement.89
88. For a comparison of opt-in and opt-out class action structures in the
United States and Europe, see Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 204−05 (2009).
89. The opt-out rate for the class is derived from 13,123 timely, valid opt-out
requests divided by the 1.2 million class notices sent. See In re Oil Spill, 910 F.
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That finality worked to the benefit of claimants because it freed
up more resources for BP to devote to the settlement. In essence, the
public machinery of the class action, with its ability to bind
absentees, requirements of transparency, and judicial assurance of
equitable treatment, allowed the plaintiffs credibly to offer BP a
greater degree of peace in exchange for more money. In other
words, abandoning OPA’s streamlined, non-adversarial, private
dispute resolution scheme for the costlier public class action
litigation system had the ability to leave both sides better off.
But it is also important to consider the additional leverage that
class action aggregation gave the plaintiffs. Finality creates value for
BP, and thus a surplus over which the parties can bargain. But it is
the class action’s ability to coordinate the efforts of a large and
diverse population of claimants—to credibly threaten litigation and
prevent holdouts from siphoning off value—that allows the
plaintiffs to effectively bargain for a portion of that surplus.
Defendants, thus, face a paradox. They need aggregation through the
class action system to get the finality they desire and cannot get
through a private dispute resolution scheme, but that same
aggregation gives plaintiffs the leverage to negotiate for a higher
return.
When peace is valuable enough to the defendant—as it appeared
to be for BP—the move from a private victim compensation scheme
to the public class action system can generate extra value that
exceeds the accompanying increase in transaction costs (e.g.,
attorneys’ fees, notice, discovery, and agency costs). And the
increased leverage that the class action gives the plaintiffs helps
ensure that value is shared. In other words, the shift from the GCCF
to the class action settlement looks like a win-win.
IV. CONCLUSION
The paradox of public litigation begins with the dispute
resolution system with apparently higher transaction costs proving
more efficient and more effective in providing compensation and
closure in the Gulf. The deeper lesson is that the public civil justice
system and its evolved procedures worked better than a jury-rigged
alternative crafted from strict maritime liability, the presumed

Supp. 2d at 937. Even this number overstates the true number of opt-outs because
an unknown portion of those opt-out requests were submitted by parties who were
not members of the class, and nearly 1,800 opt-outs later revoked their requests.
Id. at 937–38.
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damages cap of the Limitations Act, and the quick-pay approach to
individual-by-individual harms.
Beyond the resolution of the Deepwater Horizon calamity lies a
fundamental problem of how to remediate the scope of harms that
routinely result from mass society. Our point is not to enter the
debate over efficient deterrence and optimal compensation. Rather,
we use the BP oil spill as a point of departure precisely because it
was the largest environmental catastrophe in American history and
because the scale of harm provided a critical test for the efforts to
bypass the litigation system. Ultimately, class litigation—or more
precisely, class settlement—provided the simplest and most
effective way to manage the case. That lesson has significance well
beyond the immediate events in the Gulf of Mexico, even as the
class action remains legally problematic.
While the class mechanism proved effective in the Deepwater
Horizon context, the broader prospects for such class resolutions
remain unclear. Class actions are under significant assault.90 Again
and again in recent years, the Supreme Court has made it more
difficult to use class action to resolve large-scale disputes arising out
of mass injuries.91 The pullback began with Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor92 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.93 and their restrictions
on mass tort class action settlements. From there, the Court has
introduced heightened requirements of “commonality” of claims
under Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes94 and has allowed mandatory
arbitration requirements to close out class treatment of even
identical consumer claims under AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion95 and its progeny. The result is a pressure to find
alternative means of effectively resolving mass disputes at a
wholesale level outside of the courtroom. Idealized individual, caseby-case litigation in federal court is simply not a realistic option.
Asbestos claimants and defendants have sought refuge in the
bankruptcy code.96 Mass torts have shifted into MDLs, where
parties must rely on non-class aggregate settlements in their quest
90. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 729 (2013).
91. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013).
92. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
93. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
94. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
95. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006); see also Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy
and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 839, 842 (2013).
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for global resolution.97 The lawyers constructing these deals must
use innovative and controversial contractual strategies to try to
achieve full participation by claimants, as they did in the Vioxx
settlement.98 And judges are left to assert authority under a “quasiclass action” theory to provide even limited supervision and
review.99 At the same time, companies seek to bypass the litigation
system entirely by setting up their own private alternative dispute
resolution programs and incorporating mandatory arbitration clauses
with class action waivers into their consumer and employment
contracts.100
The latest such innovations are private claims facilities, modeled
largely on the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund.101
Defendants set up these private compensation or refund programs in
attempts to resolve their liabilities, while avoiding the costs of the
public litigation system. Instead of waiting to be sued, they craft
streamlined, non-adversarial administrative schemes where victims
of mass harms can obtain compensation without the need to file
lawsuits or hire lawyers.

97. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010).
98. For competing takes on the Vioxx settlement’s strategy for achieving
closure by requiring participating lawyers to recommend settlement to all of their
clients and to withdraw from representing those clients who decline, see
Issacharoff, supra note 18, and Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011).
99. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184,
196 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549,
558−62 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7,
2008), amended in part, MDL 05-1708 DWF/AJB, 2008 WL 3896006 (D. Minn.
Aug. 21, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal,
63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
100. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012).
101. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 58 (discussing 9/11 Fund, Hokie
Spirit Memorial Fund for victims of the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting). A private
fund run by Feinberg is available for victims of the sexual abuse scandal at Penn
State. See Penn State to Compensate Sandusky Victims, Erickson Says,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-19
/penn-state-to-compensate-sandusky-victims-erickson-says.html;
Penn
State
Looking to Reach Accord on Abuse Claims, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2013), http:
//www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/23/penn-state-sandusky-lawsuits
/1941057/.
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Some courts have bought into the logic that when they succeed
in lowering transaction costs, such private arrangements for
resolving mass disputes are superior to the public system of class
action litigation. In In re Aqua Dots Product Liability Litigation, for
example, the Seventh Circuit went so far as to hold that a class
cannot be certified where the defendant has already set up a lower
cost private compensation program to offer the same relief—in that
case, a standing offer of a full refund to anyone who purchased a toy
that turned out to be defective.102 Judge Easterbrook explained: “A
representative who proposes that high transaction costs (notice and
attorneys’ fees) be incurred at the class members’ expense to obtain
a refund that already is on offer is not adequately protecting the
class members’ interests,” and thus no class could be certified under
Rule 23(a)(4).103
But other courts have cautioned that this reflexive move away
from the class action is a mistake because no other system yet
discovered can offer parties the finality they seek with the same
degree of transparency, consistency, and fairness. As Judge Scirica
observed in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.: “[O]utside the federal
rules governing class actions, there is no prescribed independent
review of the structural and substantive fairness of a settlement
including evaluation of attorneys’ fees, potential conflicts of interest,
and counsel’s allocation of settlement funds among class
members.”104
OPA showed a preference for informality with its call for a
streamlined, non-adversarial, administrative procedure for resolving
disputes and providing compensation for oil spill victims. By
shedding the formalities, the inevitable delays, and the need for
102. 654 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2011).
103. Id. at 752. The district court was even more explicit in its comparative
analysis of transaction costs, finding that class certification was not appropriate
under Rule 23(b)(3) because the class action was not “superior to other methods of
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” namely the defendant’s
voluntary refund program. In re Aqua Dots Product Liab. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 377,
384−85 (N.D. Ill. 2010). See also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d
185, 195−96 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying class certification where transaction costs of
class settlement—attorneys’ fees and administrative costs—would “swallow the
entire settlement” leaving no benefit for the class over other means of adjudicating
the dispute (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 F.R.D. 340,
358 (E.D. La. 2009))).
104. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Similarly, Judge Barbier found that the class
settlement was “superior to the GCCF at the very least because it is judicially
supervised, meaning that it is a program that must meet heightened guarantees of
consistency with due process and fairness.” In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891,
961 (E.D. La. 2012).
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costly legal representation that are part and parcel of the public
litigation system, Congress hoped that OPA would lead to a
transaction-cost savings that would work to the benefit of claimants.
But even with a defendant like BP, able and willing to fund a
massive private claims resolution facility and to enlist the nation’s
preeminent claims administrator with an unquestioned reputation for
independence, that approach has been unable to recreate the features
of the class action that work best—the ability to provide peace in
exchange for a premium and the guarantees of consistent,
transparent, and equitable application to all claimants. The GCCF,
for all its efforts to rapidly provide compensation to an astounding
number of claimants in a streamlined, low-cost process, could not
measure up to the class action settlement’s ability to deliver
finality—even at a greater cost—in a fair and equitable manner. In
the end, the public dispute resolution system proved more effective
in serving the public interest in effective dispute resolution.
AFTERWORD
This Article uses the huge BP settlement of claims for economic
harm following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to illustrate a point
about the advantages offered by public dispute resolution. We set
about to address the paradox of why parties might find the
apparently higher cost use of the litigation forum to provide more
efficient closure than private agreements with apparently lower
transaction costs. As this Article goes to press, the amicable
resolution of the private economic claims has broken down into
acrimonious charges over the scope of the business claims outside of
the immediate proximity to the Gulf that should be covered by the
settlement, as well as charges of misbehavior in the settlement
administration.
While perhaps unfortunate for the parties involved, the postsettlement disputes do not alter the basic inquiry of this Article. The
current disputes are about the boundaries of the settlement. Whatever
those boundaries may ultimately prove to be, the parties entered into a
resolution of litigation that proved more comprehensive and more
generous than that afforded by the GCCF under OPA’s mandate of
quick, informal claim resolution. That the once-unified settling parties
subsequently had a falling out only makes the story more intriguing.
As Leo Tolstoy once noted of what makes human drama interesting,
“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its
own way.”105
105. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhonsky trans., Viking Penguin 2001) (1886).

